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THE HISTORICAL MATERIAL IN THE PRIVATE DIARY
OF ANANDA RANGA PILLAI (1736-61)

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BY

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X

I. FRENCH VICTORY AT TIRUVITI AND BUSSY'S CAPTURE OF GINGER

THE Diarist was told on the second of September (1750) that, on the previous day, the French attacked Muhammad Ali Khan who was encamped at Kumaramangalam and forced him to abandon his camp and set fire to his tents and goods, while the English were abused for dishonestly abandoning him 'like a guide deserting a blind man in midstream.' The army of Muhammad Ali was computed by Orme at 5,000 foot and 15,000 horse; but his disposition and camp were absurdly arranged.¹ The French advanced with their field-pieces in front, baggage carts in the rear and cavalry on each wing; the enemy's cannon and musketry did no execution; and on the advance of the troops within 200 yards of their camp, their entrenchments were abandoned and cannon deserted. The camp was broken into and the cavalry was thrown into utter confusion. Some 20 cannon, 1,000 matchlocks and 2,000 muskets were taken from them; while the tents were set on fire and Muhammad Ali himself made his escape with great loss and hurried away in the direction of Arcot. On the French side only one officer and six or seven sepoys were killed. It was reported to the Diarist that Muhammad Ali was slightly

¹ 'His camp extended between two villages which secured the flanks; the rear was defended by a river; while in the front there were several entrenchments occupied by the infantry, and in the other intervals where there were no entrenchments, cannon were planted; the cavalry, instead of being out on the plain, formed a second line within the camp.' (Orme vol. i, p. 150). In the French attack, La Tour commanded the right wing, Bussy the left, and D'Auteuil the centre. The whole camp of Muhammad Ali and all his artillery, including 30 guns and 2 mortars, bearing the arms of Great Britain according to Dupleix's *Memoirs*, fell into French hands (Dodwell).

wounded in the leg by a bullet. Dupleix planned that the troops at Tiruviti should march towards Arcot by way of Gingee or Wandiwash.¹

Meanwhile Nasir Jang continued to be indifferent to the state of affairs; and mutual recriminations were freely indulged in by his courtiers. Shah Nawaz Khan charged Mir Asad with treachery and with being in correspondence with the Pondicherry people, while Murtaza Ali Khan was told to attack Pondicherry with Mir Asad who was rebuked for having originally advised that Muhammad Ali was to be helped at all. Shah Nawaz himself is said to have boasted that, but for the Nizam's orders that he should return at once to Aurangabad, he himself would soon set out to attack the French.

Fearing that Muhammad Ali might take refuge in Trichinopoly, Chanda Sahib was advised by Dupleix to write to the *killedar* of that place, persuading him not to admit the refugee prince into the fort and promising him a valuable *jaghir* as reward. It was also reported that Muhammad Ali was afraid to halt at Gingee whither Nasir Jang had promised to send him reinforcements. Dupleix was also hopeful that, if French troops should advance in the direction of Arcot, the Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would, as they had formerly promised, have a good chance of seizing the person of Nasir Jang; while Muhammad Ali would never approach the French troops that were advancing under M. Bussy and Shaikh Hasan, the *jemadar* of sepoy. The Diarist even heard that Nasir Jang who boastfully recalled all the troops he had sent away, declaring he would march in person against the enemy, had again ordered the artillery and troops to return without delay. Mr. Saunders, the new Governor of Fort St. David, which remained the seat of the Presidency till April 1752, is said to have received a letter from Muhammad Ali, demanding

¹ It appears from the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* that Muhammad Ali had secured the friendship of the English by giving them the hope of the grant of the *jaghir* of Poonamalle, that Nasir Jang was persuaded by the intriguing Pathan Nawabs and Ramadas Pandit to order Muhammad Ali to sever his relationship with the English, that he had ordered Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah and Himmatt Khan of Kurnool to subjugate Fort St. David and Madras respectively, that Muhammad Ali contrived to give a large bribe to Ramdas Pandit through Raja Sampath Rai and Raja Bashan Das and to persuade them and Shah Nawaz Khan to see that the order for the expulsion of the English was withdrawn. When the battle was lost, Muhammad Ali fled to Gingee, but wished once again to proceed to Tiruviti to engage with the enemy; but he was suddenly recalled by the Nizam to his presence.

powder and shot for which he had advanced money and complaining of Cope's behaviour, while the latter justified his conduct, saying that the fault was not his, but that he had only obeyed Major Lawrence's orders to march back to Fort St. David.¹ The Diarist says that he heard that Floyer was at the bottom of the whole thing, while Morse was being kept under surveillance, and Lawrence was being frequently summoned to the Fort for consultation; and also the Major would be soon returning to Europe and be succeeded by Cope in command. Meanwhile events moved in quick succession. Nasir Jang remained inactive at Arcot; and the English were sulky with Muhammad Ali and 'reduced to an almost compulsory inaction.' Dupleix sent orders to D'Auteuil to detach a sufficient force under M. de Bussy to attack Gingee, the possession of which great fortress would be decisive of the fate of the Carnatic.² Bussy carried the fortress by escalade (11th September); and the feat was regarded as a wonderful achievement; while the loss of this fortress awakened Nasir Jang to the true peril of his situation.

II. FRENCH INTRIGUES—NASIR JANG'S DEATH

There followed an inaction of more than two months' duration till the beginning of December. On the side of the French, D'Auteuil seemed to be 'strangely resolved to rest on Bussy's laurels'. Dupleix indeed wrote to him urging him to advance at once against Nasir Jang. Even before the capture of Gingee, he was anxious that the French troops should march towards Arcot, as then the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would have a good chance of seizing Nasir Jang, according to their promise.³ One of the Maratha *mansabdars* in

¹ Orme says that Major Lawrence was much offended by the prevarications of Muhammad Ali who first made excuses for payment and at last declared he had none, having exhausted his treasury by giving Nasir Jang twenty lakhs of rupees. When there was no prospect of an action, as the French would not and the English could not attack, and as the English officers and men were daily falling sick, Lawrence, with the advice of Stark and Powney, recalled the troops. (*Vide Despatch to the Company from Fort St. David*, dated October 24, 1753.)

² For details of the exploit of the capture of this famous fortress see Orme, vol. i, pp. 151-2; Malleison's *History of the French in India*, new edition, pp. 263-5; and Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, vol. iii (1749-54), pp. 134-8. The force at the disposal of Bussy consisted of 250 Europeans, 1,200 sepoy and four field-pieces. The capture of Gingee was hardly rivalled 'until 40 years later under Cornwallis, we (the English) stormed certain of the rock-forts in Mysore.'

³ Diarist's entry for September 5, reporting a conversation he had with the Governor (p. 376 of vol. vii).

Nasir Jang's camp, sent a message to Chanda Sahib and Dupleix that, if the French had marched on Arcot immediately after taking Gingee,¹ the Nizam could easily have been seized, and urged that the time had now come for the French to move, in order to capture or slay Nasir Jang and establish Muzaffar Jang on the throne. It was also added that as the Pathan Nawabs and other *sardars* were secretly working on the French side, French troops should have continued to advance beyond Chetpattu which they had reached, but from which D'Auteuil had hastily retired, on hearing that Nasir Jang's forces had reached Dēsur (twenty miles off) and justified his retreat by asserting that the Pathan Nawabs and others were only deceiving them with false promises.² Dupleix tried to console himself as best he could, by saying that the French troops had not retired for any lack of confidence in themselves, but only on account of the constant rains and flooded rivers, and they would advance as soon as the rains were over and the roads became passable. Things were much worse on Nasir Jang's side. In the beginning of October, his army was encamped on the north side of the Cheyyar river which was flooded; for want of fodder and the rains, horses and bullocks were dying in numbers; the artillery could scarcely cover four miles in a day; the horsemen were unwilling to march; and Nasir Jang himself marched in the rear and not in the front of his army. The Diarist was told that many of the *sardars* had not marched with the troops, that Arcot was

¹ *The Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* of Burhanu'd-din says that after the French had captured Gingee, Nasir Jang ordered Muhammad Ali to lay siege to the captured place and to prevent any succour to the besieged from Pondicherry; and accordingly the latter sent his *Bakshi*, Md. Abrar Khan, with an army to Gingee. But the conspirators persuaded Nasir Jang to transfer the forces of Muhammad Ali to protect Conjeevaram, which, they said, was threatened by the French troops at Chingleput; and thus Abrar Khan was recalled from Gingee and sent with augmented forces to Conjeevaram; thus, in the quaint words of Burhanu'd-din, 'the *maidan* of impudence became extensive for the French and for those corrupted by mischief.'

² *Vide* pp. 395 and 399 of the Diary, vol. vii. Dupleix had gained over to his side Ramdas Pandit who was high in the confidence of Nasir Jang and through him had tried to raise sedition in the Nizam's army.

¹ Raja Ramdas was a low servant receiving the wage of one *hun* under the government of Nawab Shaheed (Anwaru'd-din) when the latter was the Nazim at Chicacole and gradually rose to importance in the durbar of Asif Jah. Later by the kindness of Nawab Nasir Jang he was given the title of Raja and was promoted to the position of the *Peshkar Bakshi* of the army'—*Eng. tr.* of the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* of Burhanu'd-din, done by Mr. Md. Husain Nainar of the Madras University.

crowded with all sorts of people and rice was scarce and sold in camp at five *pucca* seers per rupee. In his opinion, D'Auteuil knew these facts well, but had retired ingloriously from Chetpattu and attempted nothing in spite of frequent encouraging letters from Dupleix. When Sanoji Nimbalkar and Ramachandra Rao were ordered by Nasir Jang to march as an advance guard, they refused, pleading it would be dangerous and they could do nothing and advised him that war should cease and peace be made. Shah Nawaz Khan was of the same opinion and advised his master not to fight, as the army was small and a favourable time would offer itself later.¹ D'Auteuil demanded his recall from the field and pleaded sickness, the heavy rains and his men's reluctance to continue in camp in such weather; and 'Dupleix had much ado to prevent his marching his troops back to Pondicherry and forwarded to him every scrap of encouraging news that he received.' D'Auteuil actually returned to Pondicherry on October 22; and Dupleix asked the Diarist to write to Muzaffar Khan, the *jemadar* of sepoys, to remain in the villages lying between Villupuram and Gingee and join the main body if he should be directed by De la Touche who had succeeded to the command, and not to send in the guns from Gingee.

Murtaza Ali Khan meanwhile contrived to send a message to Dupleix suggesting that he would secure Arcot from Nasir Jang, that he might be made the Nawab and Chanda Sahib might get Trichinopoly, or as an alternative, that he should be confirmed in the possession of his *killa* and *jaghir* and be *diwan* to Chanda Sahib. Dupleix did not take this seriously at all. He deplored that D'Auteuil's indecision and weakness had spoiled the whole situation and that the rains should prevent the French from using their muskets and artillery which gave an advantage to the enemy.

Nasir Jang had at last ordered his troops to march towards Gingee and himself joined the main body in the beginning of October. His army was considerably less numerous than when he entered the Carnatic; but he could still count, according to the authority of Orme, 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse, 700 elephants and 360 pieces of cannon.² On the evening of the 24th October, a body of Nasir Jang's horse

¹ Diarist's entries for October 10 and 12—pp. 401, 404 and 405 of vol. vii.

² According to letters received by Dupleix, the Mughal effective cavalry was not more than 15,000

about 4,000 in number who were lying in ambush in several places round Gingee, were encountered by a few French dragoons and Muhammadan troopers. As it was heavily raining, the Muhammadan troopers could not fire and insisted on retreating to camp; the dragoons lost their way and many were killed. The French army marched the next day, but was obliged by the heavy rains, to retreat to Gingee where there were not sufficient provisions.¹

Dupleix continued his active intrigue with Nasir Jang's court where it was presently rumoured that Mir Asad and Murtaza Ali Khan were in the immediate favour of Nasir Jang and urged him to march against Pondicherry and Chanda Sahib, and that the latter had a design to seize the suspected Pathan Nawabs who were consequently on their guard.² All the same Nasir Jang let Dupleix know, through Kazi Dayem, that he was not averse to negotiations, would let bygones be bygones and would even visit Pondicherry and become the friend of the French, adding that if he were to give way to Dupleix's demands, he would be regarded as weak, feeble and helpless. Dupleix replied in suitable terms to this secret offer, protesting that he had ever been Nasir Jang's well-wisher and had not himself sought

¹ According to the letter of the *amaldar* of Gingee, quoted by the Diarist in his entry for the 27th of October, 1750.

² According to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* Mir Dayem Ali Khan, the sirdar of the advance guard of Nasir Jang's army, warned his master against the intended treachery of the Afghan Nawabs and the evil disposition of Raja Ramdas, on the very eve of his assassination. Nasir Jang even gave an order for the killing of Muzaffar Jang; but Ramdas bribed the executors and sought to delay them. The Nizam mounted an elephant, unarmed and without being protected by any armour; he was surrounded only by a few torch-bearers and *bandars*; and he rode, as the day dawned, towards the elephants of Abdul Nabi Khan and Himmat Bahadur Khan and salaamed to them. But they pretended ignorance of his presence; and he saluted them a second time with a loud voice; and followed up with the words that it was incumbent on them, brothers of the same faith, to fight the stranger. Then Himmat Bahadur aimed with his musket at the Nawab and shot him through the heart. In the confusion that ensued, Muhammad Ali departed for Trichinopoly with only Gazanfar Ali Khan and a single guide. He was joined by a dozen servants of his at Tiruvannamalai. At Ranjangudi, its Jaghirdar, Mutabir Khan Tahir, pretended under cover of hospitality to receive him in the fort, with a view to get him secured. It was only by the presence of mind of Gazanfar Ali Khan, who held the Jaghirdar in firm grip, that Muhammad Ali was enabled to escape; and the rescuer also quickly rejoined his master in safety.

See also Wilks, vol. i, note on p. 166 in which he gives the narrative of Nasir Jang's end almost verbally from the *Serve-i-Azad* whose author was in the tent of the Nizam when the alarm was given and assisted him to dress.

his enmity and had always desired the country merchants and inhabitants to be at peace. He even offered to stop all fighting if the negotiations should begin. This was the situation on October 29, after which date there occurs a hiatus in the diary which lasts on till the 16th of April, 1751. This is one of the principal lacunæ and possibly this, like other breaks, represents lost volumes ; and the Diary would probably have given us much interesting information about the negotiations with Nasir Jang and about the circumstances under which the French attacked Nasir Jang's camp on the fateful day of 16th December and the alleged mistake under which the attack was delivered just at the moment when Dupleix had made peace, whether genuinely or not.

III. A HIATUS IN THE DIARY: OCTOBER 1750 TO APRIL 1751— SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Before the Diary begins again for us in April 1751, Muzaffar Jang who was raised to the throne after his uncle's assassination, had appointed Dupleix as his deputy in all the country south of the Krishna and made a grant, to the French, of Masulipatam and Divi Island ; and it was deemed necessary that a French force should proceed to Golconda to secure Nasir Jang's treasure and firmly establish Muzaffar Jang there before any party could be raised against him. Bussy was chosen to command the French contingent and was rewarded with a present of 4 lakhs of rupees, while Dupleix received an immense sum in jewels and treasure, and all men of the French contingent received three months' pay in advance, besides valuable presents. Bussy had, as his second and third in command, Kerjean who was a nephew of Dupleix and Vincens who was his stepson. The contingent was composed of 300 Europeans and 1,800 sepoy with about 10 field-guns. Muzaffar Jang, on departing for the north, appointed Chanda Sahib to the government of Arcot. While at Pondicherry, Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib wrote to the English, demanding the restoration of the sea-ports like Devikotta that they had occupied during the recent troubles. This revolution alarmed the ruler of Tanjore who now demanded English assistance in consequence of a treaty that he had concluded with Floyer. Muhammad Ali who escaped to Trichinopoly put in his claims also for English support, but also opened negotiations with the French, as it was the harvest season and the

longer he could remain at peace with them, the greater were the chances of his collecting any revenue. He therefore contrived to prolong negotiations with Dupleix and Chanda Sahib for four months (December, 1750 to March 1751), and communicated regularly to the English all his discussions with them. Saunders, the English Governor, maintained that as Muhammad Ali had been appointed Nawab of Arcot by Nasir Jang, he continued to be the legitimate and rightful Nawab till another appointment was made from Delhi; the English having received *farmans* for the districts granted by Muhammad Ali, a detachment was sent to Trichinopoly under Captain Cope to secure it from any attempts by Chanda Sahib; and another detachment was sent to assist the ruler of Tanjore in consideration of a *farman* that he granted for Devikottai and its bounds. The English also intended to send men to Divi Island and Masulipatam to hoist English flags on the island and in the factory.¹

Chanda Sahib and the French moved out from Pondicherry only in March, 1751, and after reducing one or two forts, proceeded to Arcot to receive the tribute of the *killedars* and other notables; and he prepared to advance against Trichinopoly only towards the end of May or later, by which time Saunders had sent a force under Captain de Gingens to oppose his march.

Meanwhile events in Muzaffar Jang's camp had also moved fast. The Pathan Nawabs looked on with jealousy at the turn that affairs were taking. Pondicherry was now the pivot of the whole country; all matters were decided by the French, who were enriched by securing considerable accessions of territory.² Consequently there was great discontent which was bound to break out as soon as Muzaffar Jang

¹ Despatch of the President and Council of Fort St. David to the Company, dated Fort St. David, January 24, 1751—summarised in Dodwell's *The Madras Despatches, 1744-55*—pp. 118-9.—See also Orme MSS. O. V. 17; 1; and 15; 5; pp. 24 and 22 of Hill's *Catalogue of the Orme Collection of MSS.*

² Muzaffar Jang, according to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, conferred on Dupleix the title of Zafar Jang, granted the French the *jaghirs* of Gingee, Tiruviti and other places, while Law, D'Auteuil and other French captains were given suitable titles, *mansabs* and presents. Himmat Bahadur Khan was given the title of Rustam Jang and the *jaghirs* of Raichur and Adoni. Abdul Nabi Khan got the *jaghirs* of Gandikotta, Gooty, and Gurramkonda; and Abdul Karim Khan secured the *jaghir* of Sirā; and Ramdas Pandit got the title of Raja Raghunath Das; while Abdul Rahman got the title of Muzaffar Khan. Muzaffar Jang also wrote a friendly letter to Muhammad Ali Khan at Trichinopoly, according to the plan and counsel of Dupleix and Januji, the Maratha, and sent it along with letters from the latter.

should depart from the Carnatic. When he was encamped at Raya-choti, 5 days' march from Arcot and in the dominion of the Nawab of Cuddapah, the latter and the Nawab of Kurnool complained that Muzaffar Jang was allowing the Marathas to plunder their country contrary to his promise; and they seized some French horse and stopped the French ammunition. The Pathan Nawabs had agreed, before Dupleix and under his pressure, that half the money found in Nasir Jang's treasury should be divided amongst them, while their dominions should be increased by some districts, which were however much less than what they first demanded; and they also agreed that all the jewels should be reserved for Muzaffar Jang.¹

In the skirmish that ensued, the Nawab of Cuddapah attacked the rear-guard of Muzaffar Jang's troops which escorted the women,² whereupon the Nizam ordered his whole army to halt and prepared to march against the Cuddapah troops. Bussy who had received specific instructions to avoid all occasions of being drawn into committing hostilities, now intervened and persuaded Muzaffar Jang to first call upon the Nawab to explain the reason of his conduct. The Nawab, though defiant to Muzaffar Jang's message, sent word to Bussy that he was ready to submit to the Nizam through French mediation. This behaviour stung Muzaffar Jang to the quick and forced him to instant action. The troops of all the three Pathan Nawabs had already been drawn up in battle array and Muzaffar Jang marched to attack the rebels without French assistance, being impatient of the slow pace of their battalion. At first Muzaffar Jang's troops were repulsed; but the

¹ The Nawabs signed an agreement to this effect and swore on the *Koran* an oath of allegiance to Muzaffar Jang; and they declared that Nizam-ul-Mulk himself had never been able to obtain from them this mark of submission—(Orme : vol. I, p. 160).

² *The Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* says that Muzaffar Jang was not feeling quite safe, because of the knavery of some of the amirs of the army and the Afghans, especially of Himmat Bahadur Khan. Beyond Damalcheruvu, Mughal sepoys plundered the properties of the Afghans, in spite of their master's prohibition. In the course of the march, the Afghans one day looted a cart belonging to Muzaffar Khan (Abdul Rahman), the *Ilagadar* of the French forces. Abdul Nabi Khan offered to pay compensation, but Muzaffar Khan did not agree; and the struggle began. Abdul Karim Khan of Savanur perished; Himmat Bahadur Khan fled, heavily wounded; he was later killed by order of Nizam Ali and his head fixed on a spear. The Mughal army plundered Cuddapah on the way; but Abdul Majid Khan, brother of Abdul Nabi Khan, sought peace by paying 3 lakhs of rupees. Kurnool was attacked and the wife and children of Himmat Bahadur were taken captive.

fire of the French artillery changed the fortunes of the day and forced the Nawabs to retreat. Muzaffar Jang, heedless of the advice of Bussy, pursued the fugitives, and left the French battalion behind once more, which however endeavoured to keep in sight of him. The Nawab of Savanur died on the field ; while the Nawab of Cuddapah fled precipitately, being severely wounded. In his pursuit of the latter, Muzaffar Jang came up with the Nawab of Kurnool and proceeded to attack him personally, when, having uplifted his sword to strike, he was pierced in the head by the javelin of his opponent. Both the Nawab and his troops were overpowered and cut to pieces. The death of Muzaffar Jang left the French in great consternation, because they had now no pretension or claim to interfere in the affairs. But Bussy did not lose his presence of mind, assembled the generals and ministers, and persuaded them to raise Salabat Jang, the eldest of the three brothers of Nasir Jang who had been kept in close confinement, to the throne. French arms had again been decisive ; and Salabat Jang agreed to confirm all the cessions to the French made by his predecessor and granted additional villages round Masulipatam, as well as a large donation to the French contingent. As soon as Dupleix's approbation was received, the Mughal army left the country of Cuddapah and continued its march towards the Krishna.

IV. CHANDA SAHIB'S MOVEMENTS: APRIL-JUNE 1751

The Diarist whose available narrative begins after the hiatus from April 16, 1751, mentions the capture of the fort of Chetpattu by Chanda Sahib who had at last moved out of Pondicherry with a French contingent under La Tour and the imprisonment of Mir Asad and his family. On April 18, news was received that Salabat Jang was encamped 12 *kos* on the other side of the Krishna, after taking Kurnool and making prisoners of its Nawab (Himayat Bahadur Khan) and his family, and that when the army had advanced 16 *kos* beyond the river, where a large Maratha army was lying in wait for them, Salabat Jang made a settlement with them, through the mediation of his minister Ramdas Pandit, by consenting to give them a *sanad* for the *chauth* of the provinces of Golconda, the Carnatic and Trichinopoly and that the minister was rewarded by the Nizam with a *mansab* of

7,000 horse,¹ Salabat Jang left a son-in-law of Muzaffar Khan (Abdul Rahman) in charge of the *killa* of Kurnool.² The Diarist, recording affairs in the Carnatic, said that the Vellore affair was settled by Chanda Sahib for 6 lakhs of rupees, which meant that there was a compounding with the evil-hearted Murtaza Ali. Shaikh Hasan, the sepoy leader who accompanied Chanda Sahib along with De la Tour was to have the fort and *jaghir* of Arni, yielding two lakhs of rupees ; and his uncle, Muhammad Kamal, was also to receive a *jaghir*. Dupleix also arranged to give the lease of the Tinnevely country to

¹ The Peishwa, Balaji Baji Rao, had been jealous of Nasir Jang's rise and had entered into negotiations with Sayyad Lashkar Khan, the governor of Aurangabad, through the mediation of Ramdas Pandit. Sayyad Lashkar Khan induced Ghaziuddin, the eldest son of Naizamu'll-mulk, to oppose the succession of Nasir Jang and offer to cede to the Marathas, in return for their support, the two *subhas* of Aurangabad and Burhanpur. Thereupon the Peishwa left Poona towards the end of January, 1751, with a large army, accompanied by Fatteh Sing, Raghuji Bhonsle and other leaders. The Marathas demanded a contribution from Sayyad Lashkar Khan, which, on pretence of coercion, the latter levied to the tune of 15 or 17 lakhs of rupees ; and then they spread over the country and occupied the two *subhas*, and finally proceeded to the banks of the Krishna. When Balaji Rao was at Pangal, seven marches from Hyderabad, he received alarming news from Poona that Tarabai was preparing, in league with Damaji Gaekwad, to undermine his supremacy ; he resolved to return to Poona, and ordered Sanoji Nimbalkar to make the best terms possible with the enemy. Salabat Jang who was ignorant of the Peishwa's situation, offered 17 lakhs of rupees, two in cash, and the rest in bills on bankers in Hyderabad, Aurangabad and Burhanpur. (See Kincaid and Parasnis—*History of the Maratha People*, vol. III, pp. 1-2 ; and Grant-Duff—*History of the Mahrattas* (4th ed.), vol. I, p. 527). Grant-Duff calls Ramdas Pandit, 'the traitor Ramdass, a fit instrument for the unprincipled ambition of Dupleix.' See also *Selections from the Peishwa's Daftar*, 6, *Ramaraja's Struggle for Power*—Letters Nos. 167, 168, 180 and 201.

The Diarist's entry, that news came from Satara that Shahu Raja's wife Tara Bai Umma Bai had been imprisoned and that internal dissensions were likely, does not convey any clear meaning (p. 431 of Vol. VII). It was in reality a plot woven by two women, Tara Bai and Uma Bai, the latter being the widow of Khanderao Dabhade who had been destroyed by the Peishwa. Tara Bai saw in Uma Bai a ready ally for her plan. Uma Bai was to equip an army under Damaji Gaekwad and effect a junction with Tara Bai who even sent emissaries to Ramdas Pandit who was in Salabat Jang's service and offered him the office of Peishwa if he would advance with the Nizam's army to her help. But the plan miscarried and the Peishwa was able to triumph.

² Abdul Rahman was the dewan of M. Bussy, and better known by his title of Hyder Jang. His father was a defaulter of revenue under the Nizam's government at Masulipatam and had been friendly to the French. In his distress he fled to Pondicherry where he was kindly treated by Dupleix. 'His son, Abdool Rehman, then a boy, soon acquired the French language, was useful to Dupleix in carrying on his intrigues with Ramdass, and upon the success of them, accompanied Bussy when he went with the Mughal army' ; and he was rewarded, as seen in note 2 on p. 163 with the title of Muzaffar Khan, by Muzaffar Jang.

Titarappa Mudali who afterwards became the renter of the district under Nawab Muhammad Ali and the English.¹ Titarappa was to pay 10 lakhs to Chanda Sahib and a present of 1 lakh to Dupleix, besides presents to Madame Dupleix, Madananda Pandit and others, and was to give a lease deed for 5 years ; and the Poligar of Sivaganga and other chiefs were written to, to give the renter all possible assistance in occupying the country. But rumour was rife that as Muhammad Ali was made strong at Trichinopoly by the English and as Chanda Sahib was not in actual possession of the country, Titarappa's chance of occupying Tinnevely was not great ; while Kumarappa Mudali, the *dubash* of Governor Saunders at Fort St. David, sent word to Titarappa that he would arrange to get him the lease of the Tinnevely country from Muhammad Ali and the English Council would write about it to Mr. Cope who was with Muhammad Ali. But the cause of Muhammad Ali was not yet to gain the upper hand. The *Maravas* and others attacked the troops of Captain Cope and Muhammad Ali which advanced to take the Madura fort, broke them up and captured 3 cannon and a large number of muskets from them. Cope himself escaped with two wounds, while about 100 English soldiers were said to have fallen.²

¹ Anwar Khan was *faujdar* and *amil* of the Tinnevely country in the time of Nawab Anwaru'd-din ; he was succeeded by Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan and Hussain Muhammad Khan who jointly managed affairs till 1749. After the battle of Ambur, Chanda Sahib appointed, as *amil*, Alam Khan who managed the district on his master's behalf in 1750 and 51. He was succeeded for a short time by Titarappa Mudali and Moodemiah, the agent of Chanda Sahib. (Extracted by Caldwell from the letter of Mr. Lushington, Collector of Tinnevely, dated, May 28, 1802 ; see p. 125 of his *History of Tinnevely*.)

Alam Khan was, according to Orme, a soldier of fortune, who had formerly been in the service of Chanda Sahib and afterwards in that of the king of Tanjore ; he came to Madura, took the fort from one Abdul Hakim Khan, and observing the course of events, proclaimed his adherence to the cause of Chanda Sahib ; he was in power in Madura in the beginning of 1751. (See Nelson's *Madura Manual*, Part III, p. 269 ; and Orme.)

² Orme says that Captain Cope offered to take Madura, though his detachment was ill-equipped for a siege, and proceeded with 3 field-pieces, 2 cohorns and 150 Europeans, accompanied by 600 of the Nawab's cavalry under Abdul Wahab Khan, a younger brother of Muhammad Ali. Before Madura, these were joined by the detachment that Muhammad Ali had sent to the Tinnevely country under another brother of his. The troops were repulsed from the walls and had to relinquish the attack. Captain Cope blew the cannon to pieces, but a very large body of cavalry deserted over to Alam Khan both before and after the English broke up their camp. (pp. 169-170)—also Orme MSS. ; O. V.

Ranga Pillai notes, in his entry for April 30, 1751, that Dupleix sent the old *cowle* from Salabat Jang to Muhammad Ali and wrote desiring him to accept it¹ and deliver the fort of Trichinopoly to Chanda Sahib's people ; and to this the latter replied that he had already received from Ghaziu'd-din Khan at Delhi, a copy of a *parwana* granting him the *subahs* of Payanghat and Balaghat (Carnatic) and directing him to take possession of them, along with a copy of the Mughal Emperor's letter to Ghaziu'd-din Khan. Dupleix was greatly irritated at this reply and sent urgent letters to Chanda Sahib urging him to settle the Arni matter without further delay and, without turning aside to Arcot, to proceed straight to Trichinopoly by way of Tiruvannamalai.

Having received the submission of the *killadars* of Vellore, Chetpattu, and Arni, Chanda Sahib deemed the Carnatic to be secure enough for him under the circumstances and began his march for Trichinopoly, reaching Tiruvannamalai about the 20th of May. Dupleix asked the Diarist to write letters to the Rajas of Tanjore and Mysore and to 'the 72 *poligars* of Trichinopoly' whose names are enumerated, beginning with Malavarayan of Ariyalur, the Greater Marava (of Ramnad), the Lesser Marava (of Sivaganga) and enumerating 72 *poligars* and the six divisions of the *Kallars* (the Collieries of Orme).² The list that Ranga Pillai gives has 34 *Poligars* as belong-

Alam Khan is said to have subsequently proceeded and subdued the Tinnevely country and appointed Nabir Khan at Tinnevely and Mantimiya (Mundamiyah or Moodemiah) at Madura as his lieutenants and then joined Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoly, where he died soon after his arrival, struck by a cannon shot (Saka, 1674)—see p. 48 of vol. II of W. Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* (1835).

¹ The *cowle* from Salabat Jang which was sent by Dupleix to Muhammad Ali, was not probably known to the Diarist, and is given as Appendix No. 1, in vol. VIII of the Diary by Mr. Dodwell. It is dated March 12, 1751, and granted the *sarkars* of Rajahmundry, Chicacole, Ellore, Masulipatam, Mustafanagar and Muzaffarnagar to Muhammad Ali along with two strong forts and a *jaghir* and also promising not to call him to account for the dues of his father and himself with respect to the Carnatic and Trichinopoly revenues.

² W. Taylor gives from the *Mackenzie MSS.* a list of the 72 *palayams* appointed to guard the bastions of the Pandyan capital as they were in the time of Tirumala Nayak, including Travancore, Ramnad, Sivaganga and Pudukotta, the three last being like the adopted children of the Madura Government, and Ariyalur, Turaiyur, Iluppur, Marungapuri, Nattam, etc.

The following table, comparing Taylor's list with Ranga Pillai's enumeration, may be useful. Where it has not been possible to equate names in the Diarist's list with those of Taylor, a blank space has been indicated. (*Cont.* on pp. 169-171).

ing to the Trichinopoly country and 38 as belonging to the south. The letter that was sent to these explained how Muzaffar Jang had given Dupleix the charge of all the country and the palayams between

TAYLOR

1. The Ramnad Setupati
2. Udaiya Tevar of Sivaganga
3. The Reddi of Turaiyur
4. Puchi Nayakan of Marangapuri
5. Leckiya Nayakkan
6. Viramalaipalayam ; Kama Nayakan
7. Iluppaiyur ; Kamakshi Nayakan
8. Nattam ; Lingama Nayakan
9. Pillai-Muzhungi ; Muttayya Nayakan
10. Ideiya-kottai, Ayalur ; Valakondama Nayakan
also Maduvur ; Vallakondama Nayakan
11. Ramagiri ; Sami Nayakan
12. Maruluttu ; Amiya Nayakan
13. Yemacalapuram ; Kulappa Nayakan
14. Kannivadi ; Appayya Nayakan
15. Palni ; Chennama Nayakan
16. Periakulam : Ramabhadra Nayakan
- 17—25.
- 26—32.
33. Malayalam ; Nanjinattu Raja
34. Ariyalur (Ayalur) ; Nayanar

RANGA PILLAI

- ... Setupati
- ... Udaiya Tevan
- ... The Reddi of Turaiyur
- ... Puchiya Nayakan
- ... Lakkayya Nayakan
(of Kumaravadi)
- ... Kammaya Nayakan
- ... Kamakshi Nayakan
- ... Lingama Nayakan
- ... Muttayya Nayakan
- ... Vallakondama Nayakan
- ... Samaya Nayakan
- ... Ammayya Nayakan
- ... Kulappa Nayakan
- ... Appaya Nayakan
- ... Sennava Nayakan
(of Palni)
- .. Ramabhadra Nayakan
(of Virupakshi)
- ... The nine Goundars and
Poligars of Kangayam
- ... The seven Hill Poligars
living in Kambam and
Gudalur
- ... Nanjanadu
- ... Malavarayan
(of Ariyalur)

THE POLIGARS OF THE SOUTH

TAYLOR

- 1.
2. Sivagiri ; Varagunarama Vanniyar
3. Alakapuri Rettai-kudi (Rettai-kottai) Vanniyar
4. Do.
5. Settur Tiruvannata Tevar
6. Kolang-kondan
7. Ettaiyapuram ; Ettappa Nayakar
- 8.
9. Dumbichi Nayakan
- 10.
11. Kollarpatti ; Kalanka Nayakar
- 12.
13. Eramadai
14. Chokkanpatti

RANGA PILLAI

- ... Sinnananja Tevan
- .. Sivagiri Vanniyar
- Irattakkudai Vanniyar
- ... Alagapuri Vanniyar
- ... Settur Tiruvana Tevan
- ... Kollangondan Vanda
Tevan
- ... Ettappa Nayakan
- ... Annichi Nayakan
- ... Tumbinji Nayakan
- ... Kama Nayakan
- ... Kalanga Nayakan
- ... Kandama Nayakan
- ... Elumadai Nayakan
- ... Chokkathalavan

the Krishna River and Cape Comorin and how the grant had been confirmed by Salabat Jang ; it then proceeded to state that Muhammad Ali

TAYLOR

RANGA PILLAI

15.		...	Thadiyathalavan
16.	Panchalankurichi ; Kattabomma Nayakan	...	Kattappa Nayakan
17.	Uttumalai Maruthappa Tevan	...	Marudappa Thevan
18.		...	Tāli Vēli
19.		...	Sūttala Tevan
20.		...	Saluva Tevan
21.	Urkad ; Servakāran	...	Seturayan
22.		...	Nallakkuttu
23.		...	Nambi Thalavan
24.		...	Ananja Thalavan
25.		...	Ramabhadra Reddi
26.		...	Ramaswami Reddi
27.		...	Kumaraswami Reddi
28.		...	Venkatachala Reddi
29.		...	Sankaranarayana Reddi
30.		...	Kechalappa Nayakan
31.		...	Pethana Nayakan
32.		...	Kadalakkudi Nayakan
33.	Nagalapuram ; Iravappa Nayakan	...	Nagalapuram
34.	Melmandai Nayakan	...	Sirumalai Nayakan (of Melamandai)
35.		...	Indra Thalavan
36.		...	Kumara Thalavan
37.		...	Eravappa Nayakan

(only 37 poligars are enumerated by the Diarist)

A number of Palayams mentioned by Taylor are not found in the list of the Diarist which includes several later creations. The chiefs of Perambur and Kattalur who were Tevans by caste were among the poligars of Tirumala Nayak's time ; and Marungapuri of the Puchi Nayak family threw off an offshoot which formed a separate palayam (of Karisalpattu-Varappur) of the Boma Nayaks.

A list of the names of the chiefs actually appointed by Visvanatha Nayak and by his co-adjutor and *dalavai*, Aryanatha Mudali, can be made out from the materials contained in Ward's *survey* and in the two lists published in Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* (vol. II, pp. 160-8) as well from an unpublished Mackenzie MS. Many of these chiefs are called Nayakars who were the descendants of the captains and soldiers who helped the Nayak rulers of Vijayanagar to conquer the Madura country. The traditional story of their migration is given in several of the Mackenzie MSS. ; and they belong, for the greater part, to the castes of the Tottiyars and Kambalattars, corresponding to the Telugu Gollas and Yerragollas (Thurston and Rangachari—*Castes and Tribes of South India*, vol. vii, pp. 183-197). Among the other chiefs one is a Reddiar, another is a Tondaimanar (Kallar) and others are Gounders, Servaikarar, Tevans and Nayanars. Taylor's list divides the fiefs into 9 sections, the first comprising the bigger fiefs of Nanjinadu, Ramnad, Sivaganga and Pudukottai, the others being respectively those attached to the Manapar taluk, Dindigul taluk, Kambam and Gudalur, Madura and Trichinopoly, Tinnevely, Coimbatore and Salem. The list should have been subject to perpetual fluctuations being 'increased or diminished with the absence or existence of any one preponderating power among them.'

was given a *cowle* from Muzaffar Jang and invited to act as Dupleix desired, and, instead of doing so, he had taken shelter in Trichinopoly and made frivolous excuses; and Chanda Sahib and the French forces had, therefore, orders to capture Trichinopoly and punish Muhammad Ali; and the poligars should not help him on pain of losing their fiefs and being punished, but should help Chanda Sahib.

Ramnad was founded about 1605 by one Muthukrishnappa, rather restored to the ancient line of the *Setupathis*, according to the manuscript history of the *Carnataka Governors*, the account of the *Setupathis* translated by Taylor and the historical memorandum furnished to Nelson (in the *Madura Manual*, 1868) by Ponnuswami Tevan, the then manager of the *Zamindari*. Sella Tevar, *alias* Vijayaraghunatha Setupathi, was the ruler of Ramnad from 1748 to 1760. Sivaganga was an offshoot from Ramnad; and its existence as a separate fief dates only from about 1730; it was then ruled by Periya Udaya Tevar, the son of its founder Sasivarna Periya Udaya Tevar. The *Tondaimans* of Pudukottai, not mentioned separately by the Diarist, and evidently included by him in the divisions of the Kallars, came into prominence on account of their services to the Nayaks, about the close of the 17th century. They rose from one of the Kallar tribes settled near Anbil, in the land east of Trichinopoly, south of Tanjore and north of Ramnad, which were originally known as *Arasu*. Vijaya Raghunatha Tondaiman was the ruler at the time and took a very prominent part in the operations round Trichinopoly that followed.

See for the Poligar system, *Wilks*, vol. I, p. 34 note; Caldwell's *A History of Tinnevely*, pp. 57-8; Wilson's *Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Pandya*, p. 43; Nelson, Part III, Ch. IV *et seq*; *The Fifth Report of 1812* (1866 edn.)—vol. II, (Madras Presidency)—pp. 89-90; and C. S. Srinivasachari's paper, 'The Poligar system in the Tamil country' Its Origin and Growth' contributed to the *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Nagpur Session, 1928*.

Mr. Dodwell's notes to the Diarist's List (pp. 6-9 notes) identify the then fief-holders of Ariyalur, Turaiyur, Kollankondan, and Kolarapettai: he fixes also the fiefs of several of the poligars mentioned by the Diarist; but the places mentioned by him are not in all cases the same as those of Taylor and can be explained by the assumption that the original palayams might have been shifted. Light's *Report* (Military Consultations) of 1781 has been thoroughly utilised by him in locating these.

The main sub-divisions of the Kallars which were returned in the greatest numbers at the Census of 1891 were Isanganadu (Visanganadu), Kungiliyan, Menadu, Nattu, Piramalaiadu, and Sirakudi. The Kallars of Madura are however divided into 10 endogamous sections which are territorial in origin. Mr. T. Turnbull, writing in 1817, says that the Kallars appropriated to themselves various *nads* (regions) in different parts of the southern districts; and in each of these territories they had a chief among them whose orders and directions they must all obey (Thurston and Rangachari—*Castes and Tribes of Southern India*—vol. III, p. 53). The Visinganattukallar, Piranmalai Kallar and Tannarasu-nattu Kallar seem to have been tribes living in the Pudukotta territory (vide *A Manual of the Pudukottai State*, p. 183, and Mr. S. Radhakrishna Iyer's *A General History of the Pudukottai State*, p. 67). The filiations of the Kallars are hard to fix; but they have got, according to tradition, some close connection with the Maravars and the Agambadiyans (See Sir Athelstane Baines: *Indian Ethnography* (*Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*), pp. 81 and 47-48.

Chanda Sahib wrote shortly afterwards that he had to postpone his march to Trichinopoly, as the English under Gingens took Vriddachalam and hoisted their own flag there; Dupleix was so anxious that the place should be retaken and the English should be driven completely out of the neighbourhood that he arranged for Shaikh Hasan, the *jemadar* of sepoys, who had been sent to reduce the Chittore palayams, should be required to come and help to beat the English. The horsemen on the French side gave some trouble as their pay was in arrears; and their demand had to be forthwith complied with; and a lakh of rupees was immediately despatched to Papayya Pillai, who was one of Madame Dupleix's agents and who was now appointed *receveur general des finances du Carnatic*, in which capacity he acted tyrannically and made a very bad name for himself. In this connection, the Diarist described how large sums of money had been received by the French on Chanda Sahib's account and arrangements had been made for a bill of exchange for 16½ lakhs of rupees on Kasi Das Bukkanji, payable at the Masulipatam factory, on account of the present which Muzaffar Jang had promised to make when he reached Golconda and which had been confirmed by Salabat Jang; he also wrote that Dupleix had ordered that all payments got, other than the sums due from Mir Asad of Chetpattu and Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore which were to be paid to Chanda Sahib for the charge of his troops, were to be received for himself.

V. THE ENGLISH AND CHANDA SAHIB ADVANCE ON TRICHINOPOLY

Captain de Gingens had with him about 500 Europeans and took the field in May in order to bar the way of Chanda Sahib to Trichinopoly. He had also under him a force of *coffres* and sepoys and 8 pieces of cannon. His original instruction was that he was to wait in the vicinity of Fort St. David till he should be joined by Muhammad Ali's troops, from Trichinopoly. The English till then did not like to appear as principals in the struggle. After six weeks of waiting, Captain Gingens was joined about the middle of May, by 600 horse and about 1000 *peons* of Muhammad Ali. He then moved westwards and came in sight of Vriddachalam, whose fortified pagoda was garrisoned by 300 of Chanda Sahib's troops. The place was on the high road to Trichinopoly; and its reduction was deemed to be necessary

for the preservation of Fort St. David. The pagoda surrendered after a slight assault;¹ and after leaving a small garrison there, the English continued their further march and were joined by about 100 Europeans detached by Captain Cope from Trichinopoly and about 4,000 troops of Muhammad Ali, both cavalry and foot, commanded by Abdul Wahab Khan, a younger brother of the latter. The exact place where the junction of the troops took place is not clear; according to Captain Dalton it was at Valikandapuram (the Volcondah of Orme and other historians). Gingsens was encamped in a grove about a mile and a half from the latter place, while Chanda Sahib's forces were posted about 4 miles to the north. The rock-fort by whose side Volcondah village was situated, was that of Ranjangudi which was in the possession of a Mussalman *jahirdar*, who, though a relative of Muhammad Ali's,² was afraid to throw in his lot definitely on the side of his kinsman and refused to open his gates to the English. Gingsens first captured and burnt the village (or *pettai*) of Volcondah, but he could not take the rock-fort; while the *jaghirdar* permitted the French troops to go over to him. An action took place in the dry bed of the river which runs beneath the fort, in which the English troops fled for no apparent reason, though the officers including Clive who was then a lieutenant, did all they could to stop the disgraceful flight. This so-called battle of Volcondah [it was in reality the battle of Ranjangudi, (June 30)] was considered 'a disgraceful affair' by both Wilks and Malcolm. Orme says that Abdul Wahab Khan's troops stood their ground; and it was only the English battalion that got so

¹ Chanda Sahib's garrison surrendered as soon as they perceived the scaling ladders being put up by the attackers. The report that reached the Diarist tells that the defenders made a fairly prolonged resistance. Vriddachalam was thus the only fort north of the Coleroon which remained loyal to Muhammad Ali, after the first English attempt to succour him failed. Clive and Pigot, one of the English Council, accompanied a small detachment sent by Saunders to Trichinopoly and convoyed stores to Vriddachalam which was then beleaguered by a hostile *poligar* (July, 1751). After having entered Vriddachalam and sent on the detachment further, Clive and Pigot set out to return to Fort St. David when they were immediately surrounded by the *poligar*'s troops and escaped only after a close race. 'It was a close race and Clive's fighting nearly came to an end.'—See Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*; vol. i; p. 135 and Francis; *Gazetteer of South Arcot District*—pp. 400-01.

² The *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* says that the *jaghirdar* of the place was Mutabir Khan Tahir, son of Md. Husain Tahir; he was therefore a Tahiran and a hereditary enemy of Anwaru'd-din's family.

demoralised and broke up in panic.¹ The troops of Muhammad Ali 'behaved in this action better than ever they did afterwards, and even in the field of battle reproached the English for their want of spirit,' according to Clive, in the memorandum that he gave to Orme in 1763. According to another version, the English were regarded as having lost all their courage in this engagement. The Diarist wrote that, a letter which was received declared the English had a loss of 90 Europeans killed, including 2 officers besides the wounded, while in the detachment of Cope 110 persons had been either killed at Madura or died of sickness; but according to the English version they lost only one ensign and five or six men.²

The Diarist also makes mention of two envoys from the Raja of Mysore who came to Pondicherry with jewels and cloths as presents to the Governor who desired that the amount of the present might be given to him in ready money. It was possibly, as suggested by Mr. Dodwell, to frustrate this negotiation that Muhammad Ali sent an envoy named Seshagiri Rao to Mysore for assistance.³ A Brahman who came to Pondicherry, alleged that he had been sent by Muhammad Ali, without the English knowing it, to desire Dupleix to send some one to Trichinopoly to hoist the French flag there. This was only one phase of the intrigue by which Dupleix urged Muhammad Ali to take up the offer of Salabat Jang of the Northern Sarkars and confirm it with a grant under the seal of Chanda Sahib which latter was received by Muhammad Ali through M. Law. The person who was sent to Trichinopoly along with the Brahman, reported according

¹ For details see Captain Dalton's *Memoir* (Memoir of Captain Dalton, H.E.I.C.S. (1886) pp. 92 *et. seq.*; Orme, vol. i, pp. 172-4; Martineau's *Dupleix*, vol. iii, p. 194, and Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, vol. i, pp. 128-31, which says that some of Orme's statements are founded on a memorandum which Clive sent him in 1763. See *Catalogue of the Orme Collection of MSS.* by S. C. Hill—p. 272.

² According to a separate despatch from Governor Saunders to the Company dated August 15, 26, 'the Nawab's people and the *coffres* behaved well and our people ill. The unlucky action encouraged their (enemy's) people and depressed ours.'

³ The Dalavai, Deva Raja, was not willing to embark on this enterprise; but his younger brother, Nanja Raja, was tempted by an extravagant promise of the cession of Trichinopoly and of all its possessions, down to Cape Comorin, to lend the required assistance and agreed to make provision for Muhammad Ali by giving him the *jaghir* of Hardanahalli, at the head of the pass to Trichinopoly (p. 2470 of Ch. XI of the *Mysore Gazetteer* (New edition); vol. II; Part IV), and also Wilks, vol. I, p. 172.

to the Diarist, that the place was full of the English, and Muhammad Ali was only the nominal ruler.

Chanda Sahib had, after the action at Volcondah, followed Gingens to Utattur, situated about 25 miles from Trichinopoly and fifteen miles south of Perambalur. Two miles north of the place, the road from Trichinopoly passes between a hill and a ridge of rock which were described by Orme as the 'streights of Utattur' and by Dalton as 'the barrier to the Trichinopoly country'. Gingens was encamped in the streights, though they could have been avoided; and Dalton was posted as an advance-guard. The enemy forces were about 8 miles behind and thus the two forces watched each other for several days. On the 20th of July the English troops, consisting of a few dragoons, about 150 of the Nawab's horse and a company of sepoy were decoyed into an ambuscade of some 3,000 horse and foot. The cavalry escaped; but most of the sepoy were cut to pieces, and Lieutenant Maskelyne was taken prisoner. This disaster, though small by itself, followed so closely on the failure at Volcondah, that it had a most disheartening effect on the English. Chanda Sahib thereupon advanced his camp three miles and offered a general engagement with a very large body of horse and sepoy. Dalton who occupied the outpost, retired with skill to the main camp of the English. Chanda Sahib resolved upon a general action; but a heavy fire from the British artillery made him waver and soon compelled his troops to flight. This attack of Chanda Sahib, though repulsed, made Gingens resolve to abandon the streights on account of the possibility of the enemy posting his cavalry between the place and Trichinopoly; he moved out the same night and after a quick march of eighteen hours, encamped close to the northern bank of the Coleroon and occupied a fortified pagoda (Pichchandar Kovil). They then crossed the river followed by the French and Chanda Sahib, took possession of the Srirangam Island and the great pagoda. But even here they did not deem themselves secure from the enemy, crossed the Kaveri and took refuge on July 28th under the walls of Trichinopoly. The French also rapidly pushed on after the English; they and their allies took possession of Srirangam, conquered the mud-fort of Koiladi, near the eastern extremity of the island, crossed the Kaveri and encamped on the plain to the east of the town in the neighbourhood of what is known now as the French

Rock which stood about a mile to the south-east of the fort.¹ The position of the English was certainly inferior at that time to that of the French. Gingens was not equal to meet the situation ; there were cabals and quarrels among his officers ; and according to Dalton, all the English officers were young soldiers, 'at that time little experienced in the country-method of making war'.

From the Diarist we learn that the French troops were not better off. Chanda Sahib is said by him to have written that D'Auteuil and other French officers stubbornly refused to cross the Coleroon after the engagements at Volcondah and Utattur and wished to return to Pondicherry with their soldiers and that Shaikh Hasan and his sepoys bore the brunt of the fighting both at Volcondah and in the taking of Srirangam and the neighbouring pagoda of Tiruvanaikoyil, while the French troops, instead of marching in advance as usual, lagged several miles behind the rest of the army. Presumably, the French refused to advance and allowed Chanda Sahib to cross the Coleroon alone and occupy Srirangam as soon as the English quitted it. Chanda Sahib was reported to be telling people that the Europeans had done nothing but talk big and write daily to Dupleix letters full

¹ The date of the French and Chanda Sahib crossing the Coleroon is not certain. According to Orme, Chanda Sahib and the French took possession of Srirangam soon after it was evacuated by the English ; and about the middle of August they sent a strong detachment to attack Koiladi which was defended by a small body of English troops for several days and then given up. This success determined Chanda Sahib to cross the Kaveri, and leaving a garrison in Srirangam, he encamped with the rest of his army to the east of Trichinopoly (Vol. I, pp. 180-1). As Dodwell points out, the French, according to Law, did not cross the Coleroon until September. The Diarist writes in his entry for September 14, that he heard from a letter of Chanda Sahib that he intended to cross the Coleroon and occupy Srirangam. Apparently Chanda Sahib first crossed the Coleroon alone, without the French and possibly 'withdrew when the French refused to follow him.' (Note on p. 29 of vol. viii of the *Diary*), as several letters from Chanda Sahib are reported to have come from camp, on September 17, saying that he was about to cross the Coleroon into Srirangam.

According to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, Husein Dost Khan (Chanda Sahib) broke the pot of his honour at the *maidan* of the Nawab's Tank, adjoining Utattur and hastened to Samiavaram and encamped there. He stayed in that same place for a period of two months and twenty-days and engaged himself in taking possession of the kingdom and entrusting it to various agents. Ahsanu'd-din then marched with a French army according to the instructions of his master, Husein Dost Khan and brought under his control the temple of Srirangam and Jhamgir (Jambukesvaram) which was like a fort ; and the vapour of his breath caused by the heat of his exertions to subdue the tract of land from the Kaveri up to the back of the hill of Dhobykonda (French Rock ?) went as far as the sky.

of false complaints. The Diarist also heard news that Cope and his men got on so badly with Muhammad Ali Khan that they had resolved to depart. D'Auteuil was said to have resolved to leave Chanda Sahib's camp; and the next day news was received from Chanda Sahib that he had actually left the camp in anger and that M. Law who had already made a mark, might be made the commandant of the European troops. Dupleix was reported to be very angry at D'Auteuil's departure, but unwilling to appoint Law as his successor.

Muhammad Ali himself sent a letter to Dupleix which was received on August 8, in which he pretended that he was ready to leave Trichinopoly under a safe conduct, according to the terms of Salabat Jang's *cowle* and willing to visit Pondicherry and discuss the whole situation. The Diarist also heard that he had sent emissaries to Alam Khan at Madura and offered him terms in return for his assistance; he suspected greatly that Muhammad Ali was already suspicious of the English and could be easily persuaded into believing that the English were ready to abandon him. So when Governor Saunders wrote to Chanda Sahib, taxing him with having unjustly seized the Trichinopoly country that had been mortgaged to the English by Muhammad Ali,¹ and a reply was sent, under Dupleix's instructions and according to his dictation and wording, that the country had been given by Salabat Jang to him and the English had no right at all to it. 'Advantage was taken of Mr. Saunders' sealed letter, to prepare an inner slip, as though addressed by Mr. Saunders to Chanda Sahib, offering to deliver up the fort of Trichinopoly and the person of Muhammad Ali, provided such and such were done. This was to be folded up in the cover and given to the confidential people whom Muhammad Ali sends to M. d'Auteuil and Shaikh Hasan, to be carried to their master. As Muhammad Ali is already suspicious of the English and is secretly sending people to us for terms, it is hoped that this letter will cause quarrels between him and them and increase their ill-feeling. I hear that special letters to Chanda Sahib and M. d'Auteuil were also written about this.' Comment is needless on

¹ Saunders wrote to the Company that he had a mortgage bond for Trichinopoly and hoisted the English flag there and would protest against any French hostilities that might be committed there (letter dated August 15, 1726).

this entry of the Diarist; and Dodwell remarks that this was 'a device characteristic of Dupleix, no matter whether proposed by him or not.'

The fort of Vriddachalam was to be taken by the French, as it was the only fort on this side of Trichinopoly, still in possession of the English and Muhammad Ali. Rango Pandit, Madame Dupleix's *amaldar*, was ordered to fortify his place in the neighbourhood and entertain topasses, sepoys and Portuguese artillery men for that purpose; but when he marched against the place, the enemy sallied out and attacked him, and Rango Pandit had to run away, spiking his guns. The Diarist was glad that the attack miscarried, because, had it been successful, it would have redounded to the credit of that rascally Brahman (Rango Pandit) and Madame Dupleix.¹ Not only was this set-back a source of depression to Dupleix; but the news that the Tanjore people were inclined to the side of Muhammad Ali and the English and hailed with joy the news of Ghaziu'd-din Khan, the elder brother and new rival of Salabat Jang, recognising the title of Muhammad Ali and even celebrated the hearing of the news as an occasion for thanksgiving and festivity put him out greatly, though he affected to believe that the English should have spread the news which the Tanjoreans so readily took in. An agreement was made at Pondicherry with Gopal Rao, the *vakil* of Murari Rao Ghorepade² that the latter should take Chanda Sahib's part

¹ The Diarist's entry for August 18th, that the 200 men who marched from Cuddalore were encamped outside Vriddachalam when Rango Pandit's attack was repulsed means probably the detachment that was sent out by Saunders with a large convoy of stores to the relief of Vriddachalam which was accompanied by Clive and Pigot and which dispersed, according to Orme, the troops of a neighbouring Poligar.—*Vide* note 1 on page 173.

² Murari Rao (a grand-nephew of the famous Santaji) was the Maratha governor of Trichinopoly left by Raghuji Bhonsle; he took some part in the revolution that followed Safdar Ali's assassination and later evacuated Trichinopoly to Nizamul-Mulk and quitted the Carnatic (1743). He was hired by Nasir Jang as the commandant of a body of 10,000 horse when the latter came down into the Carnatic and sent forward to the Coleroon where he met and harassed the army of Muzaffar Jang, and Chanda Sahib returning with the French battalion from the Tanjore expedition (February-March, 1750). When Muzaffar Jang had submitted to his uncle, and the French had retired hastily with Chanda Sahib into Pondicherry (April), Murari Rao pushed on in pursuit of the French troops and greatly harassed them. He had established himself at Gooty in 1746 and got hold of Penukonda and became supreme among the *poligars* of the Ceded Districts. For his character, see Orme, vol. I, p. 363. He had a very interesting part to play in the operations round Trichinopoly and later against Hyder Ali.

either by openly attacking the enemy or by joining them and secretly working against them and that Chanda Sahib should pay each trooper that the Maratha sent, Rs. 20 per month, besides an additional sum to him when matters should have been settled. Murari Rao was expected at Pondicherry and was to be welcomed with great honour and *eclat*.

On the last day of August, news was received that Governor Saunders had despatched to Trichinopoly from Devikottai a few soldiers with provisions, shot, powder and other munitions of war; that some of Chanda Sahib's troopers and the Tanjore army attempted to attack them when they got near Trichinopoly, but that they broke through and reached the fort safely. Dupleix was angry that the Tanjore people did not effectively obstruct their march and to capture their munitions and provisions, to which the Tanjore *vakil* at Pondicherry gave an evasive reply.¹

VI. CLIVE'S CAPTURE OF ARCOT—EVENTS TILL THE END OF 1751

Dupleix resolved, according to the Diarist, to despatch 200 soldiers and officers, who had lately arrived, to Trichinopoly, on the 1st of September and asked Raza Sahib to accompany them; the latter agreed to do so and begged for two lakhs of rupees at least with which he could pay off sepoys and horsemen who were heavily in arrears, but had to start only with half a lakh. Soon the news of Clive's diversion to Arcot came to be known. It was deemed by Madame Dupleix that it would not be advisable to recall Chanda Sahib's or the French troops from before Trichinopoly but that they would be sending troops from Pondicherry to help Polur Muhammad Ali Khan (brother of Chanda Sahib) at Arcot. She asked that the two sons of

¹ This refers to the second reinforcement sent by the English to Trichinopoly where great discontent prevailed among the officers and several had to be removed. A commission was given to Clive (Fort St. David Consultation of July 22/August 2, 1751) and he proceeded with a detachment into the country of Tanjore where he was joined by another from Devikottai under Captain Clarke who took the command to the whole which consisted only of 100 Europeans and 50 sepoys with one small field-piece. The French detached from Koiladi, 30 Europeans and 500 sepoys and had a skirmish with the English detachment, at a place 10 miles east of the latter. The English gained access to Trichinopoly by making a detour in order to avoid the enemy's camp. (Orme; vol. i, p. 182 and Forrest's *Clive*, vol. i, p. 137).

Bangaru Yachama Nayaka of Venkatgiri¹ and other poligars of the neighbourhood should be written to immediately to send troops to Arcot, while Chanda Sahib was asked to send as quickly as possible 2,000 horsemen to Arcot for the help of Polur Muhammad Ali Khan; and Sayyad Muhammad Khan of Tadpatri who had been ordered to go to the Musaravakkam *kill*, was now ordered to proceed to Arcot with his 200 match-lock men.

News was received on September 12, that the English had reached Conjeevaram and tied *toranams* there and were intending to occupy Kaveripakkam and Musaravakkam, while a small body of Polur Muhammad Ali Khan's men were encamped near Damarle (Damal) in order to attack the English. Dupleix tried to encourage the merchants who were alarmed by telling them that a very large army was being despatched from Pondicherry to Arcot, so that no fort or army could resist them, whereas in reality he could send only about 150 men of very inferior calibre. On the 15th of September, it was known in Pondicherry that on the previous day the English had hoisted their flag at the Nawab's palace and occupied the fort, while the day before (i.e. 13th September) Polur Muhammad Ali Khan and others had fled to Vellore.²

¹ Bangaru Yachama Nayaka, surnamed Sarvagna Kumara, died in 1748, leaving two sons, Bangaru Yachama Nayak and Pedda Yachama Nayak. The latter quarrelled with his brother and attempted to get a *sanad* for the whole estate of Venkatagiri from the Nawab of Arcot who decided that the two brothers were to live in peace at different places. Their *vakils* were at Pondicherry, soliciting Dupleix's favour and being compelled to pay large sums both to Dupleix and to Chanda Sahib. The younger brother died in A.D. 1754; and the elder received the *sanad* for the whole estate in the previous year from Nawab Muhammad Ali who had triumphed over his rival. It was reported by the Diarist that, after the death of Nasir Jung, the two Nayak brothers were to pay Muzaffar Jang two lakhs of rupees and Chanda Sahib one lakh. The former payment was made through Ramdas Pandit; and as a *jaghir* had been given for 4,000 horse, although the *mansab* was 5,000, the Nizam now gave the additional *jaghir* for 1,000 horse. Chanda Sahib demanded three lakhs, but was paid one lakh through Dupleix who got bonds from their vakils.

² Saunders wrote on August 15/26, that it had been resolved to leave 3 or 400 men to defend Trichinopoly fort, and according to the Nawab's desire, make a diversion in the Arcot country, with the rest, joining the Nawab's forces, with a view to raising contributions. Subsequently he wrote on the 30th September/11th October, to the Company that he had put in execution the design of making a diversion in the Arcot country, in order to draw off the enemy from Trichinopoly. 130 men under Clive embarked on August 22/September 2, from Fort St. David for Madras where they were joined by 80 more. The detachment that proceeded against Arcot, consisted of about 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys with 8 officers

The English capture of Arcot did not greatly disturb the minds of the Pondicherry folk. Polur Muhammad Ali Khan wrote to say that when the English garrison at Arcot marched against Timiri fort, he sent his son with a small force of Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore and repulsed them; and that, with reinforcements, the enemy could be quickly driven out of the Arcot *kill*. Murtaza Ali Khan sent word to the same effect and required reinforcements before the enemy could strengthen himself. Dupleix however realised the seriousness of the loss of Arcot and was so angry that the Diarist wrote, 'even I fear to stand before him;' how much more then will others fear? He urged that Chanda Sahib who had already sent 1,000 horsemen, should write to his son, Raza Sahib, to march at once to Arcot with another 1,000 horse; and also that he should immediately cross the Kaveri and attack Trichinopoly.

M. d'Auteuil and other officers had all along been written to by Dupleix that they were not to return to Pondicherry, but advance with Chanda Sahib's troops. It was likely that when Chanda Sahib crossed the Coleroon first, D'Auteuil obstinately refused to follow him and demanded to return. A letter from Chanda Sahib received at Pondicherry on August 7, is reported by the Diarist in his entry for that date, to have contained the news that D'Auteuil had left the camp in anger and should have already arrived and reported the state of affairs and that Law might be made the commander of the European troops. On September 17, another letter received from Chanda Sahib says, according to the Diarist, that if D'Auteuil departed, Law might be appointed commander. To this Dupleix is said to have replied that he had recalled D'Auteuil and Bernier and appointed Law as commander with orders to cross the Coleroon and the Kaveri before

and 3 field-pieces. They marched from Madras on August 26/September 6, reached Conjeevaram three days later and the neighbourhood of Arcot on August 31/September 11, and took possession of the fort the next day, hoisting both the English colours and Muhammad Ali's flag and protecting the inhabitants.

It is to be stressed that, for sometime past, Muhammad Ali had been proposing a diversion in the direction of Arcot, and at first Saunders and the English Council thought that this might be effected by Gingens leaving a sufficient number of men in Trichinopoly and marching with a force into the Arcot country. But Gingens could not appreciate his capacity for the task and Clive persuaded Saunders that he could do it. News of the English march to Arcot did not reach Dupleix for a week.

the Nawab's troops. Law set out from Pondicherry for camp on September 8th and took over the command on 18th; and the real operations of Chanda Sahib against Trichinopoly began only after this date.

In his letters, Chanda Sahib said that Muhammad Ali had sent *vakils* to him, promising to accept the terms of the *cowle* formerly offered to him and to evacuate Trichinopoly twenty days later and asked that D'Auteuil who had the *cowle* with him, might be desired to hand it over to him. Dupleix had, by this time, become very suspicious of Muhammad Ali and was convinced that the latter was asking for a truce of twenty days in order merely to strengthen his position at Arcot and to collect provisions and stores for the defence of Trichinopoly, which he could not have the least intention to give up. He wrote thus to Chanda Sahib and asked him not to allow even the least delay in crossing the Coleroon and the Kaveri.

On October 11, letters were received at Pondicherry that Chanda Sahib's army was encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly and that Alam Khan of Madura, to whom the English had written offering a place under Muhammad Ali, in return for his assistance, was marching to Chanda Sahib's assistance, along with other poligars from the south, while the Raja of Mysore was inimical towards him openly. Ranga Pillai's *Diary* furnish no details of the events happening before Trichinopoly in the fateful months October 1751 to February 1752; and there follows a hiatus during March and April. With regard to the Mysore negotiations with Pondicherry of which mention was made by the Diarist in his entry for July 8th, nothing seems to have followed. A letter of the captain of the English forces at Trichinopoly, written to Fort St. David was seized by the French on September 13th; therein, according to the Diarist's version, it was stated that the Mysore army had not yet arrived, but when they did, he would, in conjunction with them, attack the enemy. This meant that an agreement had already been made between the Raja of Mysore and Muhammad Ali. The Mysore *vakil* who had been sent to Pondicherry, still continued at that place; and when questioned by the Diarist, he declared that when he was accredited to Pondicherry, his master had no idea of assisting Muhammad Ali, but that troops had been marched only as a measure of precaution. He also added that Chanda Sahib was always abusing the Mysoreans to their *vakil* at his camp and

threatening to seize their country. In October, as was seen above, the Diarist wrote that Chanda Sahib and the Raja of Mysore were on bad terms. In the next entry of the Diarist, dated November 8, Chanda Sahib is said to have written to Dupleix that he was again friendly with the Raja of Mysore whose *vakil* had proposed certain terms and that he had agreed to the demands which were as follows :—

(1) That part of the Trichinopoly country which had long been in the possession of Mysore should not be interfered with; (2) the poligars who had joined Mysore should not be molested, and (3) 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot of the Mysore army which should constantly remain with Chanda Sahib, the latter should assign for their maintenance lands adjoining Mysore and yielding 3 lakhs annually. Chanda Sahib agreed to them and offered to cede Sondikuppam and certain countries seized by the Tondaiman for the maintenance of the troops, and not to molest any poligar except him of Turaiyur. Dupleix agreed to write to the Dalavai of Mysore, promising to fulfil the terms of Chanda Sahib's agreement, as desired by him.¹ It was likely that the agreement of Chanda Sahib with the Mysore *vakil* was not intended to be a genuine one, but, as Mr. Dodwell suggests, 'only to delay matters until the Mysore preparations were complete' and 'represent a stage in the bargaining between Mysore and Muhammad Ali which ended in his unfortunate promise to cede Trichinopoly.' As a matter of fact though a letter was received at Fort St. David in October, 1751, from the Mysoreans promising to join Muhammad Ali, their contingent did not arrive at Trichinopoly till early in the following year.²

On the 13th of December, the Diarist heard that Nanja Raja (who was exercising all real authority and was usually called the young *Dalavai* as well as surnamed *Karachuri* [hand and dagger], equivalent to the English phrase 'a word and a blow') had assembled at Dharma-puri, above the Changama Pass, 2,000 or 3,000 horse and 5,000 or

¹ The Dalavai, Deva Raja, was averse to engaging to help Muhammad Ali or interfere at all; but his younger brother, Nanja Raja, was tempted, by extravagant promises, to assist him. According to Meer Hussein Ali Khan Kirmani (*History of Hydr Naik-tr* by Col. W. Miles, 1842—p. 35), Nanja Raj associated himself with Murari Rao and other poligars and marched towards Trichinopoly with an army of 7,000 cavalry and 10 or 12,000 foot, the Raja however not consenting to this movement. The aged Dalavai, Deva Raj, was averse to the proposals of Seshagiri Pandit, the ambassador of Muhammad Ali to Mysore (Wilks—vol. I. p. 172.)

² See notes on pp. 58 and 69 of the *Diary*, vol. VIII.

6,000 foot and that Murari Rao had visited him and was also there with 2,000 horse and that both intended to help Muhammad Ali. When Dupleix heard this news, his anger against Chanda Sahib burst forth and he exclaimed that the latter had made enemies of the Rajas of Mysore and Tanjore, alienated the poligars, who hindered all cultivation and that he might be pensioned off with a *jaghir* or forced to retire to Mecca, as the country would be ruined if it remained in his possession longer. The Diarist was glad that the Governor was angry with Chanda Sahib and wrote, 'God has dealt justly with Chanda Sahib and punished him within the year for his having cheated me (of expected rewards)'.

As a measure of retaliation for Nanja Raj joining Muhammad Ali, Dupleix ordered that the Turaiyur people should tie *toranams* in the adjoining Mysore country. But just at that time Deva Raja died and Nanja Raj had to return to the capital, but not before he and Murari Rao had time to plunder the Salem mint and fort.

To return to the doings at Arcot:—The alleged repulse of the English before Timiri fort reported by Polur Muhammad Ali and written by the Diarist in his entry for September 18, 1751, had probably a reference to Clive's first movement against Timiri on September 15th, when the English, according to Orme (vol. I, p. 184), marched out to meet the fugitive Arcot garrison of 600 horse and 500 foot drawn up near Timiri and forced them to retreat to the hills in their rear. Dupleix urged that Raza Sahib should immediately proceed to Arcot; but the latter asked for 2 lakhs of rupees towards the charges of his 3,000 horsemen, as otherwise, they might retire from Volcondah to which they had advanced, to Gingee and refuse to accompany him (Diarist's entry for the 24th of September).

Meanwhile Clive's troops had sallied out on Timiri (a fort situated about 7 miles south of Arcot, on the Arni road) on the 17th, but could not secure its surrender. On the night of the 25th September, when the reinforced enemy took up a stand within 3 miles of Arcot, Clive made a surprise attack and returned with some plunder. When the latter seized the Conjeevaram pagoda, Clive sent a small body to dislodge him and convoyed safely the 2 eighteen-pounders that were sent to him from Madras and beat back the enemy who advanced to attack the fort (27th September). When Raza Sahib finally reached Arcot and took possession of the town and

the palace, the famous siege began (4th October). Clive's sortie on the besiegers (5th October), the failure of a reinforcement under Lieutenant Innis to reach the besieged, the securing by Raza Sahib of battering cannon from Pondicherry and of Murtaza Ali who came with 2,000 men, the latter's trick of pretending to quarrel with Raza Sahib and inviting Clive to join in attacking him, the decision of Murari Rao to throw in his lot with the brave besieged, Raza Sahib's offer of a proposal to Clive to surrender, the final attack of the besiegers on the 24th November, their failure and departure on the next day—most of these incidents are not noted by the Diarist; and he only records in a matter-of-fact manner how Raza Sahib was driven from Arni to Chetpattu, by the English and the Marathas (entry for the 17th December) and how Clive marched on Conjeevaram which had meanwhile been taken by the French, reduced it and compelled the garrison to flee to Chingleput (entry for the 31st December).

Regarding the operations before Trichinopoly we have better information from the Diarist. In his entry for the 11th October, he wrote that letters were received on that day to the effect that Chanda Sahib's army had been encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly. On the 8th November he reports that Chanda Sahib had sent on Salabat Jang's *takid* parwana to Muhammad Ali and was expecting news of its receipt by the latter and of what might take place in consequence.¹ He is said to have also written that, if Muhammad Ali did not accept the *parwana*, the sepoy in the fort who had accepted a *cowle*, would make over the fort to him. Dupleix replied that Chanda Sahib should not relax his efforts, but make every effort, day and night, to capture the fort without delay. Towards the close of November, news was received that Hasanu'd-din Khan and his troops attacked the battery built by Cope outside the fort gate and that Cope and Gingers were not

¹ Chanda Sahib mentions in his letter that a copy of the *parwana* was sent to the Governor of Fort St. David. It is interesting to note in this connection that Saunders in writing to the Directors on 24th October (o.s.) mentions a letter alleged to have been sent by Salabat Jang, but suspected to be the production of Dupleix and Chanda Sahib; and remarks that it was curious that the letter should arrive on the same day as Chanda Sahib's answer to his previous letter (see note 1, p. 176), and it was bruited about that Chanda Sahib and others have counterfeit seals of the Mughal and his officers. Saunders offered that Chanda Sahib might hold Arcot, and leave Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali, pending the Mughal's decision; but the offer was rejected—see Dodwell's *Madras Despatches*, 1744-55, p. 146 and p. 145.

pulling on well, the latter favouring Muhammad Ali Khan and the former opposing him. Towards the end of December there was a battle between the English and Hasanu'd-din Khan at Trichinopoly in which the latter was repulsed after a severe fight and rescued by Law and Alam Khan moving to his assistance and rescuing Shaikh Hasan and those who remained with him. The Diarist heard that Hasanu'd-din Khan was lured into an ambush and many of his men were cut off, though Chanda Sahib, Alam Khan and Law advanced to his help; and finally they were forced to abandon the battery which they had occupied.¹ Thus the year 1751 closed with the French fortunes beginning to sink in both the Arcot and Trichinopoly spheres. The triumphant march of Salabat Jang and Bussy to Aurangabād, their subjugation of the rebellious *killedar* of Nirmal, the great influence of the French at the Nizam's Court—these are noticed by the Diarist in their places; but the details available of Bussy's doings are scanty.

¹ M. d'Auteuil had been succeeded by Law, the nephew of the famous financier who was obstinate, if anything, and resolved against Dupleix's advice that the city should be reduced not by storm, but by sap and mine. The English thought at first that Chanda Sahib would merely blockade the place and not even besiege it (Saunders' letter to the Company of September 30/October 11). The French established themselves at Sarkarpalayam (Chukleypalayam of Orme) on the south bank of the Kaveri, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-east of the city, and their principal battery was raised a little to the south of the north-east angle of the fort. They also mounted guns on the French Rock and in the Srirangam Island and on the rock of Erumbesvaram.

(For a plan of the dispositions and operations see Hemingway's *Trichinopoly District Gazetteer*—map between pp. 330 and 331; Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, vol. I. map facing p. 60 and Orme vol. III. (ed. of 1862), maps and plans and Martineau's *Dupleix*, vol. III, map facing p. 206). The first fight took place when the French surprised the English entrenchments opposite the French Rock. Their guns were not effective and Law would not change their position. When a party of Mysore horsemen arrived about the middle of October, they accompanied a body of English troops under Dalton who put a large body of Chanda Sahib's cavalry to flight. There were a few other engagements in December in which Chanda Sahib's cavalry fared badly. The incident of the ambush is probably that narrated by Orme in pp. 204-5 of his first volume (1862 ed.)

(To be continued)